
**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT COURT OF OREGON**

Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse, 405 East 8th Avenue, Eugene, OR 97401

Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond and William Joseph Goode, 3900 Stockton Hill Road, Suite B-184, Kingman, AZ 86409; Phone: (562) 667-7095; Next Friend acting on behalf of Petitioner, Rule 17, 28 U.S.C.

Tribunal - Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury¹:

P.O. Box 59; Valhalla, New York 10595

TO - Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan, assigned by UUSCLGJ

[NOTE: *Written approval from UUSCLGJ required for any reassignment*]

**Court of Origin - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, de facto
CASE NO. 6:10-CR-60066-aa, statutory**

Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond
and William Joseph Goode,

Petitioner

Against

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief
Judge Ann L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David
Glerup (retired), U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S.
Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S. Attorney Frank R.
Papagni, Jr.,

Respondents

**Assigned: Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan
FEDERAL CASE NO. 1776-1789-2015, de jure
CORAM NOBIS²**

**Writ of Habeas Corpus Order to Show Cause
And Writ Certiorari³**

American Jurisprudence Constitutional Law §326: Free Justice and Open Courts; Remedy for All Injuries: In most of the State Constitutions there are provisions, varying slightly in terms, which stipulate that justice shall be administered to all

¹ “**The grand jury** is an institution separate from the courts over whose functioning the courts do not preside... the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three (3) Articles. It is a constitutional fixture in its own right. In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people... The grand jury’s functional independence from the judicial branch is evident, both in the scope of its power to investigate criminal wrongdoing; and, in the manner in which that power is exercised. ‘Unlike [a] [c]ourt, whose jurisdiction is predicated upon a specific case or controversy, the grand jury can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated; or, even because it wants assurance that it is not.’” United States v. John H. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 504; U.S. 36, 118, L. Ed. 2d, 352, (1992).

² **CORAM NOBIS:** Before us ourselves, (the King, i.e., in the King’s Bench) applied to Writs of Error directed to another branch of the same court, e.g., from the full bench to the court at nisi prius. 1 Archb. Pr. K. B. 234.

³ **Writ Certiorari:** Latin meaning to be informed of; to be made certain in regard to; the name of a Writ of Review or Inquiry. Leonard v. Willcox, 101 Vt. 195, 142 A. 762, 766; Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858.

without delay or denial; without sale or prejudice; and, that the courts shall always be open to all alike. These provisions are based largely upon the Magna C[h]arta, Chap. 40, which provides: "*We will sell to no man. We will not deny to any man either justice or right.*" The chief purpose of the Magna C[h]arta provision was to prohibit the King from selling justice by imposing fees on litigants through his courts; and, to deal a death blow to the attendant venal and disgraceful practices of a corrupt judiciary in demanding oppressive gratuities for giving or withholding decisions in pending causes. It has been appropriately said that in a free government the doors of litigation are already wide open; and, must constantly remain so. The extent of the constitutional provision has been regarded as broader than the original confines of Magna C[h]arta; and, such constitutional provision has been held to prohibit the selling of justice, not merely by magistrates, but by the State itself.

To Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired), U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr.: Please take **NOTICE** that on **December 31, 2015**, a **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS** was filed in the above-entitled court.

EMERGENCY HEARING - PAPERS DUE: January 8, 2016; RESPONDENTS ARE TO MAIL RESPONSE TO: P.O. Box 59; Valhalla, New York 10595.

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired)
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse
405 East 8th Avenue, Room 5500
Eugene, OR 97401-27

Chief Judge Ann Aiken
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse
405 East 8th Avenue, Room 5500
Eugene, OR 97401-2706

Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired)
485 North Court Avenue No. 6
Burns, OR 97720-1524

U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger
United States District of Oregon
Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse
1000 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Room 401
Portland, OR 97204

U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter
Office of the U.S. Attorney General
405 East 8th Avenue, Suite 2400
Eugene, OR 97401

U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr.
Office of the U.S. Attorney General
405 East 8th Avenue, Suite 2400
Eugene, OR 97401

IT APPEARING THAT THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED THERETO, Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired), U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr. are directed, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §2243, to forthwith release the party, herein-named as Petitioner, from custody. If Petitioner is not forthwith released from custody, then within three (3) calendar days after service of this Writ, Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired), U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr. shall make a Return, certifying the true nature and cause of the detention; and, shall Show Cause why the Writ should not be granted; mailing the same to P.O. Box 59, Valhalla, New York 10595, no later than 5pm on the last day of the above-stated, three-day (3) period allowed for response.

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired), U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr. must each state in his Return, plainly and unequivocally:

- 1) Whether or not he has the party, herein-named as Petitioner, in his custody, or under his power, or restraint.
- 2) If he has the Petitioner in his custody, or power, or under his restraint, he must state the authority, and cause of such imprisonment, or restraint.
- 3) If the Petitioner is detained by virtue of any sworn Writ, Warrant or other written authority, a sworn copy thereof must be annexed to the Return; and, the original produced and exhibited to the Court or Magistrate on the Hearing of such Return. All unsworn documentary evidence will be refused for cause as hearsay.
- 4) If the respondent upon whom the Writ is served had the Petitioner in his power, or custody, or under his restraint at any time prior, or subsequent to the date of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; but, has transferred such custody, or restraint to another, the Return must state particularly to whom, at what time and place, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer took place.
- 5) The Return must be signed and sworn to by the respondent making the same; and, except when such respondent is a sworn public officer and makes such Return in his official capacity, it must be verified by his oath.
- 6) The applicant or the Petitioner detained, may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the Return or allege any other material facts.
- 7) The Return and all suggestions made against it, may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.
- 8) When the Writ or Order is returned, a day shall be set for a Hearing that is not more than three (3) days after the Return, unless for good cause additional time is allowed.
- 9) Because the Petition presents issues of fact, as well as issues of law, if Petitioner is constrained by actual physical force, then the Jailer is required to produce, at the Hearing, the body of the Petitioner detained.
- 10) Was the grand jury instructed that code violations are law?
- 11) What documented proof of a crime was submitted to the grand jury?
- 12) Was the grand jury advised of their right of nullification?
- 13) Did the jury members fill out a questionnaire before being chosen? If so, provide a copy.
- 14) Was the Indictment approved as to form without the signature of a Grand Jury Foreman?
- 15) Why is the Indictment, written by a BAR Attorney, telling a story and offering no authenticated evidence and/or sworn statements from any injured party?
- 16) Are there any Affidavits from a witness?
- 17) Are there any Affidavits from an injured party?

- 18) Answer all charges in Petitioner's Petition.
- 19) Rebut Petitioner's Affidavit.

The Court is to notify this body (UUSCLGJ) by mail; and, Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond and William Joseph Goode by mail and phone; to inform them as to the time and date of the Hearing to be held at the above-said courthouse. At the Hearing, Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan shall summarily hear and determine the facts; shall dispose of the matter as law and justice require under American Jurisprudence, a/k/a the rules of common law, not chancery; and, shall mail by United States Post Office a certified copy of Decision immediately (within 24 hours) to the Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury for judicial review.

If respondents default and therefore schedule no Hearing, then Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan shall confirm release of Petitioner and abatement; and, inform the Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury of the same by mail.

THE COURT dated December 31, 2015.

(seal)



Grand Jury Administrator

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT COURT OF OREGON**

Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse, 405 East 8th Avenue, Eugene, OR 97401

Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond and William Joseph Goode, 3900 Stockton Hill Road, Suite B-184, Kingman, AZ 86409; Phone: (562) 667-7095; Next Friend acting on behalf of Petitioner, Rule 17, 28 U.S.C.

TO: Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury

P.O. Box 59; Valhalla, New York 10595

RE: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, de facto

CASE NO. 6:10-CR-60066-aa, statutory

Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond and
William Joseph Goode,

Petitioner

Against

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired), Chief Judge Ann
L. Aiken, Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired), U.S.
Marshal Russel E. Burger, U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter, U.S.
Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr.,

Respondents

FEDERAL CASE NO. 1776-1789-2015

Petition for Habeas Corpus for Cause¹

American Jurisprudence Constitutional Law §326: Free Justice and Open Courts; Remedy for All Injuries: In most of the state Constitutions there are provisions, varying slightly in terms, which stipulate that justice shall be administered to all without delay or denial; without sale or prejudice; and, that the courts shall always be open to all alike. These provisions are based largely upon the Magna C[h]arta, Chap. 40, which provides: *“We will sell to no man. We will not deny to any man either justice or right.”* The chief purpose of the Magna C[h]arta provision was to prohibit the King from selling justice by imposing fees on litigants through his courts; and, to deal a death blow to the attendant venal and disgraceful practices of a corrupt judiciary in demanding oppressive gratuities for giving or withholding decisions in pending causes. It has been appropriately said that in a free government the doors of litigation are already wide open; and, must constantly remain so. The extent of the constitutional provision has been regarded as broader than the original confines of Magna C[h]arta; and, such constitutional provision has been held to prohibit the selling of justice, not merely by magistrates, but by the State itself.

COMES NOW Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Steven Dwight Hammond and William Joseph Goode, hereinafter referred to as Petitioner, People of Oregon State, in this court of record under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, whereby the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law arising under the Constitution; and, Article, IV, Section 4, whereby the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government and shall protect each of them against invasion of rights. The jurisdiction being the SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND under Article VI, Clause 2, Petitioner hereby petitions the Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury,¹ hereinafter referred to as judicial tribunal,² for the right of Writ of Habeas Corpus³ to inquire into the cause of imprisonment and restraint of Liberty of said petitioner who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the following custodians:

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan (retired)
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse
405 East 8th Avenue, Room 5500
Eugene, OR 97401-27

Chief Judge Ann Aiken
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse
405 East 8th Avenue, Room 5500
Eugene, OR 97401-2706

Harney County Sheriff David Glerup (retired)
485 North Court Avenue No. 6
Burns, OR 97720-1524

U.S. Marshal Russel E. Burger
United States District of Oregon
Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse
1000 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Room 401
Portland, OR 97204

U.S. Attorney Amy E. Potter
Office of the U.S. Attorney General
405 East 8th Avenue, Suite 2400
Eugene, OR 97401

U.S. Attorney Frank R. Papagni, Jr.
Office of the U.S. Attorney General
405 East 8th Avenue, Suite 2400
Eugene, OR 97401

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN to the Court and all interested parties that Case No. **6:10-cr-60066-AA**, (statutory) in the de facto UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, is

¹ The sureties of the peace of faithful service: Magna Carta, paragraph 49.

² Judicial Tribunal: ...having attributes; and, exercising functions independently of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hold it. Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229; Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Metc. Mass., 171, per Shaw, C.J.; Ledwith v. Rosalsky, 244 N.Y. 406, 155 N.E. 688, 689; Black's 4th, 425, 426.

³ The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended. US Constitution Article I Section 9.

removed to the de jure UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, common law, for Habeas Corpus for Cause.

**PETITIONER MAY PROSECUTE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSE OF THE RESTRAINT**

- 1) Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be in writing, signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended; or, by someone acting on his behalf. 28 U.S.C. §2242.
- 2) Every person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his Liberty or Property, under any pretense whatsoever, may prosecute a Writ of Habeas Corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.

“In the United States Habeas Corpus exists in two forms: Common Law and Statutory. The Constitution for the United States of America acknowledges the Peoples’ right to the common law of England as it was in 1789. It does not consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules; but, broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason and common sense...” Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W. 2d 543, 547, 228 Minn. 400.

28 U.S.C. §2243: Issuance of Writ; Return; Hearing; Decision: A court justice, or court judge [tribunal] entertaining an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, **shall forthwith award the Writ**; or, issue an Order directing the respondents to Show Cause why the Writ should not be granted; unless it appears from the Application that the Applicant, or person detained, is not entitled thereto. The Writ, or Order to Show Cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three (3) days.

The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended... United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9.

- 3) This Habeas Corpus is prosecuted because the taking of the People into custody was without due process in a court of law, a/k/a court of record. The respondents’ court acted under statutes; and, therefore, was not a court of record; but, rather, a nisi prius court. In this way jurisdiction was fraudulently acquired without petitioner volunteering or knowingly agreeing to the proceeding.
- 4) Respondents gathered a biased statutory jury; a jury not under common law; a jury under a court not of record, i.e., not at law⁴; a jury which has no power to fine or imprison.⁵
- 5) No State can deprive any person of life, Liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor, deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Any court that ignores due process is not a common law court. Such action of a court that deprives or denies due process of law proves that court to be unlawful; and, consequently, having no legal authority over the Petitioner without his consent.

⁴ **AT LAW**: This phrase is used to point out that a thing is to be done according to the course of the common law; it is distinguished from a proceeding in equity. Black’s 4th.

⁵ **COURTS OF RECORD and COURTS NOT OF RECORD**: “...the former [Courts of Record] being those whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled, or recorded, for a perpetual memory and testimony; and, which have power to fine or imprison for contempt. Error lies to their judgments; and, they generally possess a seal. Courts Not of Record are those of inferior dignity, which have no power to fine or imprison; and, in which the proceedings are not enrolled or recorded.” 3 Bl. Comm. 24; 3 Steph. Comm. 383; The Thomas Fletcher, C.C.Ga., 24 F. 481; Ex parte Thistleton, 52 Cal 225; Erwin v. U.S., D.C.Ga., 37 F. 488, 2 L.R.A. 229; Heininger v. Davis, 96 Ohio St. 205, 117 N.E. 229, 231.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Annotated Statute: *“The State citizen is immune from any and all government attacks and procedure.”* Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 19 How. 393. The Supreme Court has stated clearly: *“...every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowmen [fellowman] without his consent.”* Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 2 S.E. 70.

- 6) The nisi prius court is, in fact, a nisi prius court falsa because respondents have taken unlawful dominion of Petitioner so as to deprive him of his court of law. Petitioner should be immediately released so that he may return to the jurisdiction of his own court. Any charges of incompetence are fraud on the court. See Affidavit(s) attached.
- 7) Petitioner herein declares: He has seen no sworn documentary evidence from a competent fact witness to lawfully assert a challenge to his competency as one of the People; no servant has the authority to declare differently without evidence in a court of law; government servants cannot restrain or incarcerate people because they disagree with them.

Any constitutional provision intended to confer a benefit should be liberally construed in favor of the clearly intended and expressly designated beneficiary. *“Then [that] a constitution should receive a literal interpretation in favor of the Citizen is especially true with respect to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the Liberty and security of the Citizen in regard to person and property.”* 16Am Jur 2d, Sec. 97; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 128.

- 8) Petitioner has been subjected to unlawful imprisonment or restraint. Petitioner is thus petitioning William Joseph Goode, his friend for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to demand that his Liberty be restored.

**BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS’ COURT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN A COURT OF RECORD BUT INSTEAD
FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER COLOR OF LAW
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE**

- 9) The Constitution for the United States of America, Article III, Section I, grants that judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.⁶ No judge may act without jurisdiction; and, all lawful jurisdictions must be ordained and established⁷ by the People.
- 10) The Constitution for the United States of America, Article IV, Section 4, guarantees a Republican Form of Government⁸ and protection against domestic Violence. When a judge enforces acts beyond his authority

⁶ **GOOD BEHAVIOR:** “Good behavior” means conduct that is authorized by law. “Bad behavior” means conduct such as the law will punish. *State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 815, 112 S.E. 593, 594; Orderly and Lawful Conduct. Huyser v. Com., 25 Ky.L. Rep. 608, 76 S.W. 175; In re Spenser, 22 Fed.Cas. 921; “Good behavior” means conduct conformable to law; or, to the particular law theretofore breached. Ex parte Hamm, 24 N.M. 33, 172 P. 190, 191, L.R. A.1918D, 694; Baker v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 437, 205 S.W. 399, 401.*

⁷ **U.S. CONSTITUTION, PREAMBLE:** “We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

⁸ **U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE IV SECTION 4:** “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government; and, shall protect each of them against Invasion; and, on Application of the Legislature or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”

under color of law,⁹ judicial immunity is lost.¹⁰ Such actions are nothing less than lawless violence.¹¹ Likewise, legislative jurisdiction that is not authorized by the United States Constitution is as inoperative as though it had never been passed,¹² and, judges proceeding without jurisdiction are indictable for treason.¹³ Judges are expected to know the law.

- 11) The Constitution for the United States of America, Article III, Section 2, authorizes two (2) jurisdictions: Law and Equity.¹⁴ A court of equity follows the forms and procedure of chancery as distinguished from common law.¹⁵ A “court of equity” and a “court of chancery” are synonymous.¹⁶ A court of law means court of common law,¹⁷ a court for the People. In alleged¹⁸ criminal cases, when judges claim that they are bound by legislation authorized by the Constitution as they act under equity, rather than law, they commit fraud on the court. The Law of the Land is common law,¹⁹ not equity; and, judges in every State are bound thereby.
- 12) Equity courts are nisi prius²⁰ courts; courts not of record; courts proceeding according to statutes. They have no power to fine or imprison; and, to do so is a crime. Courts of law are courts of record and proceed according to common law.
- 13) Under Common Law the following maxims apply:

“For there to be a crime, there must to be a victim (corpus delicti). In the absence of a victim there can be no crime.”

“For a crime to exist there must be an injured party. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional rights.” Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945.

⁹ **COLOR OF LAW:** The appearance or semblance of legal right without the substance. Black's 4th; *State v. Brechler*, 185 Wis. 599, 202 N.W. 144, 148; *“Misuse of power [is power] possessed by virtue of State law; and, [is] made possible only because [the] wrongdoer is clothed with authority of State; [and,] is action taken under ‘color of State law’.*” *Atkins v. Lanning*, 415 F. Supp. 186, 188.

¹⁰ “When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.” *Rankin v. Howard*, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert. den.; *Zeller v. Rankin*, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

¹¹ “No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and, an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.” *Ableman v. Booth*, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

¹² “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” *Norton v. Shelby County*, 118 U.S. 425 p.442.

¹³ “We (judges) have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.” *Cohen v. Virginia* (1821) 6 Wheat. 264; *U.S. v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200.

¹⁴ **U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 2:** The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.

¹⁵ **COURT OF EQUITY:** A court which has jurisdiction in equity; which administers justice and decides controversies in accordance with the rules, principles and precedents of equity; and, which follows the forms and procedure of chancery; as distinguished from a court having the jurisdiction, rules, principles and practice of the common law. *Thomas v. Phillips*, 4 Smedes & M., Miss., 423.

¹⁶ **“EQUITY” and “CHANCERY”:** “Court of Equity” and “Court of Chancery” are constantly used as synonymous in the United States. It is presumed that this custom arises from the circumstance that the equity jurisdiction, which is exercised by the courts of the various States, is assimilated to that possessed by the English courts of chancery. Indeed, in some of the States, it is made identical therewith by statute, so far as conformable to our institutions. *Wagner v. Armstrong*, 93 Ohio St. 443, 113 N.E. 397, 401.

¹⁷ **AT LAW:** Is used to point out that a thing is to be done according to the course of the common law; it is distinguished from a proceeding in equity. Black's 4th.

¹⁸ “The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which is to be decided.” Harlan F. Stone, 12th Chief Justice U.S. Supreme Court, 1941.

¹⁹ **U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI:** This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and, all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and, the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

²⁰ **NISI PRIUS:** Where courts bearing the name “nisi prius” exist in the United States, they are instituted by statutory provision. “Nisi prius” is a Latin term. “Prius” means “first”. “Nisi” means “unless”. A “nisi prius” procedure is a procedure to which a party FIRST agrees UNLESS he objects. A rule of procedure in courts is that if a party fails to object to something, then it means he agrees to it. A nisi prius procedure is a procedure to which a person has failed to object. A “nisi prius court” is a court which will proceed unless a party objects. The agreement to proceed is obtained from the parties first. *Bouvier's Law*; Black's 5th.

- 14) Constitutions must be construed to reference the common law; summary proceedings are null and void.²¹ “‘As to the construction with reference to Common Law, an important canon of construction is that constitutions must be construed to reference to the Common Law.’ The Common Law permitted destruction of the abatement of nuisances by summary proceedings; and, it was never supposed that a constitutional provision was intended to interfere with this established principle; and, there is no common law of the United States in a sense of a national customary law as distinguished from the common law of England, adopted in the several States. In interpreting the Federal Constitution, recourse may still be had to the aid of the Common Law of England. It has been said that without reference to the common law, the language of the Federal Constitution could not be understood.” 16Am Jur 2d, Sec. 114.
- 15) Respondent Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan and Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken acted without constitutional authority, thereby without jurisdiction and under color of law, using unconstitutional statutes and summary proceedings that are null and void under common law. Furthermore, respondent Magistrate Judge Michael R. Hogan and Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken refused to identify the jurisdiction he was operating under, which clearly was not under common law; and, therefore, was under equity, a court not of record, a court without the power to imprison, a court without the consent of Petitioner, a court thereby acting under fraud; therefore, a Writ of Habeas Corpus should issue.

**BECAUSE NO JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR CUSTODY
HAS BEEN PROFFERED OR STATED
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE**

- 16) Broad Meaning of Jurisdiction on Habeas Corpus: For purposes of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, as for purposes of prohibition or certiorari, the term “jurisdiction” is not limited to its fundamental meaning; and, in such proceedings, judicial acts may be restrained or annulled if they are determined to be in excess of the court’s powers, as defined by constitutional provision, statute or rules developed by courts.
- 17) The Liberty of the People is restrained by the CUSTODIANS:
- a. Petitioner is in custody by color of the authority of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, and/or the custodians; and, is or was committed for trial before some court thereof. 28 U.S.C. §2241 (c) (1).
 - b. Petitioner is in custody, in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2241(c) (3).
- 18) Although the true cause of custody of Petitioner has not been stated by the respondents, Petitioner, on information received, believes that the claim of authority is under color of law, in violation of the constitutions of Oregon State and the United States of America. The true basis for jurisdiction by the custodians has never been proffered or stated. Petitioner, as the People, never knowingly or voluntarily agreed to such jurisdiction. Petitioner disputed, and continues to dispute, any false allegation that such agreement was made.

²¹ **SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS:** Summary proceedings are those matters, which when in dispute, are decided without the intervention of a jury. Summary proceedings must be authorized by the legislature; except, perhaps, in cases of contempt, because summary proceedings are unknown to the common law. When cases are to be adjudged promptly, without any unnecessary form, the proceedings are said to be summary. In no case can the party be tried summarily, unless such a proceeding is authorized by legislative authority; except, perhaps, in the case of contempt, because the common law is a stranger to such a mode of trial. Bovier’s Law; 4 Bl. Com. 280; 20 Vin. Ab. 42; Boscawen on Conv.; Paley on Convict.; vide Convictions.

- 19) The jurisdictional facts leading up to the custody and restraint are unknown to Petitioner. The jurisdictional facts by which the custodians presume authority to continue to deprive Petitioner of a court of record are unknown to petitioner.
- 20) Petitioner, on information and belief, alleges that the custodians are funded in whole or in part by the STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON. Thus motivated, they are acting under color of law as contractual agents of their principal, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
- 21) The court lacks Personam Jurisdiction because it proceeds under statutes; is, therefore, a nisi prius court not of record; and, does not have Petitioner's consent.
- 22) Petitioner did not consent; and, therefore, is immune from any and all government attacks and procedures.²²
- 23) Petitioner is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature; and, is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowman without Petitioner's consent.²³
- 24) The custodians do not state and the proceedings do not show any lawful authority or jurisdictional facts enabling the custodians to lawfully take dominion over a People of Oregon. Lacking such jurisdiction, their actions can only be under color of law, violating due process, in order to execute their own private agendas, whatever those may be. Therefore, a Writ of Habeas Corpus should issue.

**BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE**

- 25) Respondents proceeded as a court of equity, which is not a court of record; and, therefore, had no power to imprison Petitioner.

Confirmatio Cartarum:²⁴ *"...sovereign People shall not be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed... but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."* Magna Carta, Chapter 39, sometimes referred to as Chapter 29.

- 26) Petitioner responded *Obsta Principiis*²⁵ from the beginning; and/or, continues the same, against said first of all courts not of record, state or federal.
- 27) Petitioner was denied due process of law, which denial of due process of law violated Petitioner's unalienable rights as protected by the 5th Amendment:

"No person shall be... deprived of life, Liberty or property without due process of law. Due course of law: this phrase is synonymous with due process of law, or 'law of the land'; and, means law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice." Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dunmeyer 19 Kan 542; *"Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice [courts of record] is due process."* Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 11 S.Ct. Rep 577, 35 L.Ed 225.

²² **SUPREME COURT ANNOTATED STATUTE:** *"The state citizen is immune from any and all government attacks and procedure."* Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 2 S.E. 70; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 19 How. 393.

²³ "...every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowman without his consent." Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 May Term 1796.

²⁴ **CONFIRMATIO CARTARUM 1297:** The Magna Carta must be accepted as the common law by government. The Magna Carta is the supreme law. All other contrary law and judgments are void.

²⁵ **OBSTA PRINCIPIIS:** (Latin) Withstand beginnings; resist the first approaches or encroachments. J. Bradley, Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 635, 6 S.Ct. 535, 29 L.Ed. 746.

28) Petitioner was deprived of his unalienable right of due process in a “court of law”, a/k/a common law, as secured by the 5th Amendment; and, therefore, a Writ of Habeas Corpus should issue.

**BECAUSE PETITIONERS WERE THE VICTIMS OF BARRATRY
MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE**

29) Petitioner charges all respondents with conspiracy to execute common barratry,²⁶ maintenance²⁷ and Champerty.²⁸

**BECAUSE CUSTODIANS HAVE ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE
BURDEN IS UPON RESPONDENTS TO REBUT PRESUMPTION**

30) The court not of record, that has no power to restrain, imprison, take property or fine, is holding Petitioner for the action of the statutorily instructed and reactive grand jury.

31) Petitioner objects to the jurisdiction and process of the court not of record.

32) The court not of record that has no power to restrain, imprison, take property or fine; and, in violation of its own corporate charter, has, therefore, unlawfully restrained the liberty or property of Petitioner.

33) Respondents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §241;²⁹ 18 U.S.C. §242;³⁰ 42 U.S.C. §1983;³¹ and, 42 U.S.C. §1985;³² exceeded their jurisdiction; acted under color of law, using statutes to willfully subject Petitioner to retaliatory incarceration and/or restraint while conspiring to deprive Petitioner of Petitioner’s rights; and, acted to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Petitioner in an attempt to prevent the free exercise and enjoyment of Petitioner’s unalienable rights of Liberty and due process.

²⁶ **BARRATRY:** In criminal law. Also spelled "Barretry." The offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise. 4 Bla.Com. 134; State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511, 512, 513.; "Common barratry is the practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings." Pen.Code Cal. § 158; Lucas v. Pico, 55 Cal. 128; Corn. v. McCulloch, 15 Mass. 229; Ex parte McCloskey, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 531, 199 S.W. 1101, 1102.

²⁷ **MAINTENANCE:** consists in maintaining, supporting, or promoting the litigation of another.; "Act of maintaining, keeping up, supporting; livelihood; means of sustenance." Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Miller, 184 Ark. 415, 42 S.W.2d 564, 566.

²⁸ **CHAMPERTY:** is a bargain to divide the proceeds of litigation between the owner of the liquidated claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation. Draper v. Lebec, 219 Ind. 362, 37 N.E.2d 952, 956.; A bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. Small v. Mott, 22 Wend., N.Y., 405; Gilman v. Jones, 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 785, 7 So. 48, 4 L.R.A. 113; Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, C.C.A.Mo., 143 F.2d 889, 895, 154 A.L.R. 1191.; The purchase of an interest in a thing in dispute, with the object of maintaining and taking part in the litigation. 7 Bing. 378.

²⁹ **18 U.S.C. §241 CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS:** If two (2) or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person, in any State, in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right, they shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or both.

³⁰ **18 U.S.C. §242 DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW:** Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person, in any State... to the deprivation of any rights... shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one (1) year, or both.

³¹ **42 U.S.C. §1983 CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS:** Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any... person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.


³² **42 U.S.C. §1985 CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS:** If two (2) or more persons in any State or Territory conspire for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, [of] any rights, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages against any one (1) or more of the conspirators.

- 34) Respondents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2382,³³ acted treasonously when they imprisoned or restrained Petitioner and concealed both their actions and the hidden-court, bond-chattel, moneymaking enterprise operating under color of law; all acting knowingly in concert, with none dissenting.
- 35) Demand is now made to make full material fact disclosure; to see financial books of the Court Registry Investment System; make disclosure of the bid bond, payment bond and the performance bond underwritten against this case; and, make an offer of proof in the aforesaid matters. Demand is also made to show how the court is not profiteering by way of Petitioner's incarceration; show with clean hands how it does not have a strong financial interest to incarcerate the Petitioner and deprive Petitioner of his constitutionally-protected due process rights; and, further explain how the court is not operating constitutionally infirm and not committing honest-services fraud against We the People.
- 36) Respondents exceeded their authority thereby acting under color of law to injure Petitioner.
- 37) Petitioner has not waived common law venue; and, insists on proceeding in a court of record, which is Petitioner's unalienable right.
- 38) Petitioner maintains position as natural man; and, not a person or corporation.

This application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is signed and verified by Petitioner or on behalf of Petitioner by Next Friend, acting on his behalf.³⁴ 28 U.S.C. §2242.

Next Friend: "A next friend is a person who represents someone who is unable to tend to his or her own interest." Federal Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 17, 28 U.S.C.A.

I, William Joseph Goode, affiant, being of lawful age, qualified and competent to testify to; and, having firsthand knowledge of the aforementioned facts; do hereby affirm that the following facts are true, correct and not misleading.




 William Joseph Goode


NOTARY

In California State, Los Angeles County, on this 31 day of December, 2015, before me, the undersigned notary public, Karina Ortega, personally appeared William Joseph Goode, to me known to be the living man described herein who executed the foregoing instrument and has sworn before me that he executed the same as his free will act and deed.

A Notary Public or other Officer completing this Certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this Certificate is attached; and, not the truthfulness, accuracy or validity of that document.

(Notary seal).





 Notary

My commission expires: March 24 2018

³³ **18 U.S.C. §2382 MISPRISION OF TREASON:** Whoever having knowledge of treason, conceals, and does not make known the same to some judge, is guilty of treason for contempt against the sovereign; and, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than seven (7) years, or both.

³⁴ **NEXT FRIEND:** Based on Title 28 U.S.C. §454 1940 ed. (R.S. §754). Words "or by someone acting in his behalf" were added. This follows the actual practice of the courts, as set forth in United States ex rel. Funaro v. Waichorn, C.C. 1908, 164 F. 152; Collins v. Traeger, C.C.A. 1928, 27 F.2d 842, and cases cited.

Affidavit of William Joseph Goode

I, William Joseph Goode, Affiant, being of lawful age, qualified and competent to testify to, and having firsthand knowledge of the following facts, do hereby swear that the following facts are true, correct and not misleading.

Beginning on or about December 10th through December 14th of 2015, I met with Dwight Lincoln Hammond of Burns, Oregon, to write an Affidavit of his case with the Federal Government regarding events which have occurred during the last fifteen (15) years.

On December 13th, Dwight took me to meet with Steven Hammond, his son. Dwight told me about the following events with the Federal Government; we prepared an Affidavit, thinking Dwight might sign it; but, then, he declined to do so.

In 2001, Dwight and Steven started a routine-prescribed burn on their private property to improve the productivity of the range for the following year. Before starting the fire, Steven called the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Fire Dispatch, seeking permission for the burn. Per the recording played in court, Steven was given the burn permission; the BLM was performing prescribed burns a short distance away. After burning the desired grass on the private property of Hammond, the fire moved over to their grazing land and burnt an additional 127 acres of public property. At that time they thought nothing about it because these burns benefit the health and productivity of the land as testified to by the BLM in the 2012 trial. However, the BLM reprimanded them by letter for not getting a fire permit to burn on public land.

In 2006, a large fire was started by lighting that claimed thousands of acres within a short period of time; and, for several days burned through the area; working its way towards the upper parts of the Hammond ranch. In an effort to save their winter grazing grass; and, even possibly their home, Steven started a backfire on their private property to create a fire break; and, possibly extinguish the fire. The backfire was successful; saved their grazing land; and, their home. Steven has practical experience with fire; has participated in rural Fire District meetings; all of which makes him skilled in fire management. No one was ever endangered from the fires Steven managed. Dwight and Steven have never started a fire with malice or intent to harm any person or property.

Harney County Sheriff David Glerup released Police Report No. 0608252 regarding the 2006 fire. That report accused Steven of starting a fire on public land and poaching deer without a license. The fire in question was set on Hammond private property. All roads used during the fire were right-of-access roads to their property. The Oregon State Fish & Game Department could not find animal carcasses in or around the grass-burn area. The Hammonds started a private-property grass burn; and, never poached deer.

On August 24, 2006, Range Conservationist and BLM Employee Joe Glaskock asked Steven to meet him at the Frenchglen Hotel for coffee; Steven agreed; Glerup and BLM Ranger George Orr positioned themselves to watch the hotel; Glerup and Orr arrested Steven when Steven left the hotel; Glerup and Orr subsequently released Steven; and, told Steven to get Dwight. Both Steven and Dwight went to the office of the Sheriff in Burns whereupon both were booked and charged with State Charges: four (4) counts of Reckless Burning; four (4) counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person; one (1) count of 1st Degree Criminal Mischief.

A short time later, Glerup, Orr and Sheriff Deputy [name unknown] raided the home of Dwight. The Search Warrant authorized search and seizure of a boot matching a specific footprint; and, truck tires matching a specific tread print. The specific boot and tread prints were found near one of many fires; but, no matching prints were found in the home or on the property of Dwight.

To December 14, 2015, neither Harney County District Court nor Harney County Office of the District Attorney ever notified Dwight for a Hearing or an Arraignment pertaining to the accusations or charges.

District Attorney Tim Colahan dismissed all charges after reviewing them; and, allowed the charges to move into statutory expiration.

In 2010, five (5) days before the Statute of Limitations expired; almost five (5) years after the 2006 fire, the Office of U.S. Federal Court Attorney Frank Papagni notified Dwight in writing that Papagni was charging Dwight with “Terrorism” under the Federal Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in the case of the 2006 backfire and the 2001 grass burn; charges vastly different from the original State charges of 2006.

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Pendleton Division in Eastern Oregon assumed jurisdiction over the trial of both Dwight and Steven.

During June 12th through June 21, 2012, U.S. District Judge Michael Hogan disallowed time for certain evidence, i.e., the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management & Preservation Act of 2000. Prosecution used most of the allotted trial time; Hogan disallowed an extension of time to present evidence of the Steens Act which evidence would have exonerated both Steven and Dwight. Papagni was given full use of six (6) trial days for prosecution. Dwight Attorney Mark Blackman was allowed one (1) trial day for defense; which prevented facts of the fires, historical land management and intentions of Steven’s actions from entering the trial record or being heard by the jury. The Judge allowed evidence as to whether Steven and Dwight started the fires; but, not as to their intent in doing so.

Papagni called Dwight’s grandson, Steven’s nephew, Dusty Hammond to testify; Dusty was thirteen (13) at the time of the events on trial; and, twenty-four (24) when he testified. Dusty said, in trial, that Steven had told him to start the fire; Hogan noted that Dusty’s memories as a 13-year-old boy were not clear or credible; nevertheless, Hogan allowed the testimony.

During jury selection, Hogan and Papagni selected jurors unfamiliar with the customs and culture of ranchers; and, how land is managed in Eastern Oregon; Jurors traveled to/from Pendleton each day; some more than four (4) hours round trip; by trial day eight (8), jurors were exhausted; expressed desires to be home. On the final trial day, Hogan pressed for a verdict; several times during deliberation, Hogan pressed for a decision; Hogan never apprised the jury as to the punishment that could be imposed for a conviction under the 1996 Terrorist Act.

On June 22, 2012, the Jury found Dwight and Steven guilty of starting the fires. Hogan sentenced Dwight and Steven under Arsonist Terrorist charges; which carry a minimum sentence of five (5) years; Hogan, in overruling the minimum sentence, commented, “If full five (5) years were required, it would be in violation of the 8th Amendment.” [prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment] Hogan sentenced Dwight to three (3) months in prison; and, Steven to one (1) year and one (1) day in prison.

After the Criminal Trial, the BLM stipulated a \$400,000 fine as part of a Civil Suit despite BLM Range Conservation Agent Dave Ward and retired BLM Fire Specialist Roy Hogue testimony that there had occurred no damage to land; that land productivity had improved; no fire suppression or rehabilitation costs existed.

On February 14, 2014, the BLM denied renewal of grazing permits to the Hammonds; rendering their co-mingled private property/BLM land unusable for grazing; reducing the value of their private property.

At the 2012 trial, Papagni and Steven agreed not to appeal.

On October 30, 2012, during Sentencing, Papagni announced he would appeal the reduced sentences; Hogan retired as Federal Judge on that same day.

On November 6, 2012, Papagni filed Appeal in the 9th District Federal Court at San Francisco seeking resentencing for the balance of the minimum sentence of five (5) years.

On March 25, 2015, the 9th District Federal Court at San Francisco remanded the Appeal of Papagni to the United States 9th District Court at Eugene.

On January 4, 2013, Steven and Dwight reported to prison; served their time.

In March, 2013, Dwight was released.

In January, 2014, Steven was released.

On February 20, 2015, Dwight and Steven moved the United States Supreme Court for Writ Certiorari.

On March 25, 2015, Chief Judge Ann Aiken in United States Supreme Court denied the Writ Certiorari.

On October 7, 2015, Aiken resentenced Dwight and Steven for the balance of the minimum sentence of five (5) years; and, ordered them both to report for imprisonment on January 4, 2016.

On or about November 19, 2015, Hammond Attorneys Kendra Matthews and Lawrence Matasar, in telephone conference with Dwight and Steven, relayed intimidation Papagni had conveyed; intimidation of early detention; prior to January 4, 2016; and, threat of time in a less desirable prison were the Hammonds to continue communications with Ammon Bundy.

On August 26, 2014, in the Civil Case, Mediator Susan Leeson held a Mediation with Steven, Dwight, Dwight's wife Susan, U.S. Attorney Neil Evans, Insurance Attorney Brent Smith and Hammond Attorney Alan Schroeder which resulted in a stipulated Agreement in Principle compelling Steven and Dwight to grant the BLM First Right of Refusal in the Sale of the Hammond Ranch in the event of inability of the Hammonds to meet the full payment of the \$400,000 stipulated fine.

To December 14, 2015, the Hammonds have paid the BLM \$200,000; with the remaining \$200,000 due before the end of 2015. Should the Hammonds be unable to make payment according to the stipulated agreement, they would be compelled to sell ranch land with the BLM having First Right of Refusal; or, with the Hammonds facing further prosecution for failure to meet the Civil monetary obligation.

It should be noted that the February 14, 2014, BLM denial to renew the Hammond Ranch Grazing Permits significantly reduced the value of the Hammond Ranch. No Federal compensation has ever been given for the loss of the Grazing Permits which the Hammond Ranch purchased in February, 1964.

The Hammonds seek relief from Federal Court abuse through a Writ of Habeas Corpus.


William Joseph Goode


NOTARY

In California State, Los Angeles County, on this 31 day of December, 2015, before me, the undersigned notary public, Karina Ortega, personally appeared William Joseph Goode, to me known to be the living man described herein who executed the foregoing instrument and has sworn before me that he executed the same as his free will act and deed.

A Notary Public or other Officer completing this Certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this Certificate is attached; and, not the truthfulness, accuracy or validity of that document.

(Notary seal)




Notary

My commission expires: March 24, 2018